**ECON 541 Economic Development**

**4 credits, Spring 2017**

**Instructor**

**Professor Jeffrey B. Nugent**

**Office: KAP 318C**

**Office Hours: Mon 2:15-6PM, Tues and Thursday 12-1PM, 6-&PM and by appointment**

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**Class Meetings:**

**KAP 147 Tuesday, Thursday 4:00-5:50 PM Extra Sessions Friday March 10 and Tuesday, May 2f**

**Special Notes**: (1) If you want to take advantage of very recent research in Development Economics, you may wish to attend some of the presentations in the Development Seminar normally held on Wednesday afternoons 4-5:30 PM in KAP 319. In the early part of the semester these may not be relevant. I will announce relevant ones.

(2) Every student is to fill out the Student Information Sheet handed out at the first class and those whom I have not had in class before are requested to meet with me during the first three weeks for a personal introduction.

(3) Since this syllabus is prepared in advance of the semester, please note that circumstances may arise requiring some adjustment in the syllabus during the semester.

(4) The extra sessions identified above are to make up for my absence due to conference attendance during the week March 20-25. Hence, there may be no class during that week.

**I. Purposes**: (1) To familiarize the student with the main theoretical perspectives on the problems of developing or less developed countries (LDCs).

(2) To introduce the student to a wide variety of problems and paradoxes in development; some readings are the classics dating back to the 1950s while others are very current.

(3) To familiarize the student with some of the different methodological approaches to the field and which help distinguish this field from others in economics, including both micro and macro perspectives, political economy, disequilibrium, equilibrium traps, linkages, power relations, state-citizen and interest group relations, informality, institutional economics and experimental economics.

(4) To give the student experience in critical evaluation of the assumptions, modeling, empirical evidence and the validity of the policy and other recommendations derived from existing theories and models, including some of the most recent methodological advances.

(5) To get the student started on doing original research in the field by solving existing puzzles and paradoxes, critiquing and modifying existing models, identifying ways to obtain more relevant empirical evidence, developing new models and deriving new policy implications.

(7) To give students practice in presenting in class via ppt research of others as well as of themselves..

**II. Background:** Given the considerable interest in this subject by students outside of Economics and even some advanced undergraduate students, the prerequisites for this course are deliberately limited to only Econ 303 or its equivalent, and some statistics or econometrics background. Naturally, the tools of graduate microeconomics Econ 500 or 503 are highly desirable as well as MA level econometrics since on most topics considered special attention is given to empirical testing of development theories. However, to cater to the students without such background, class discussion and many of the readings will be non-mathematical. Many of the readings, however, contain sections involving algebraic formulations and the use of calculus.

Students with strong theoretical and empirical tools are strongly encouraged to (and indeed are expected to) attempt applications of these tools when and where they feel they are relevant. ***Students are encouraged to share their experience in or on developing countries with the rest of the class when that experience seems relevant to the issues and articles under discussion.***

**III. Standards, Course Requirements and Grades**:

(1) Grading in this course is generally from A to C or C-.

(2) The work load in the class is quite heavy and hence students are discouraged from taking more than two other graduate level courses in Economics.

(3) **No requests for INCOMPLETE** at the end of the class will be considered unless strictly justified for emergency health reasons.

(4) In so far as possible and unless announced to the contrary, students are expected to read the assigned material prior to or immediately after the date at which it is dealt with in the class indicated in this syllabus unless otherwise specified. **After the first two weeks, students will take turns serving as discussants and/or presenters of these papers. You can choose papers for presenting from among papers indicated by \* on papers indicated in Section VII below. You may want to pick papers either from this list or other papers that you make use of in dealing with your short or longer papers. Each student will be required to make two or three such presentations of about 20 minutes each. Advice: get started with one such presentation as early in the semester as possible. Look ahead to topics you are especially interested in since these should be presented at the time the class is focused on that topic.**

(5) In writing papers, students should be careful to attribute to others the data, ideas, etc. taken from them by providing detailed references so as to **avoid any suspicion of plagiarism** and make it easy for anyone reading the paper to quickly locate the reference. In so far as possible, data should be obtained from standard international or standard sources, including on-line and electronic sources not from blogs etc. **Every paper should attempt to have an introduction, brief review of relevant literature, a theoretical model (or section), and empirical or at least anecdotal evidence.**

(6**) Class Participation is an important part of the course and will consist of attendance, questions both asked and answered, and the quality of paper presentations. Students are expected to be prepared for class and to intervene when relevant and to make reports and presentations when asked**.

(7) **Overall weights in final grade**: Class participation including class presentations (**10%**)), 2 Short Papers (**10% each**) with 12 page maximum for the text part (not including tables, figures) double spaced. Term Paper (**30%**) (30 page max), a Mid-Term Exam (20%) and Final Exam (2**0%**). The exams will be based on starred readings (\*) and class discussion (which includes (\*\*) items that will be presented orally.

**V. Schedule of Due Dates**

**Jan 10 First Class**

**Jan 29 Last Day to drop the class without a grade of W**

**Paper 1: Th** **Feb 9 2 PM** in paper form

**Proposal for Term Paper**: **T. Feb 21 2PM** in both paper form and electronic submission through Blackboard

Motivation, what you are going to do, data and methods to be used

With permission this could be an expanded, deeper and more original research version of a short paper

**Mid-Term Exam: Th, March 22**

**Paper 2:** **T March 28 2PM in Paper Form**

**Term Paper**: **Th April 27 2 PM** in both paper form and electronic submission through Blackboard

**Last Class Friday April 28 or Tuesdy May 2**

**Final Exam:** Thursday May 5 2-4PM

**No Class** March 14, 16

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| --- | --- |
| **April 11** | **Last day to drop a class with a mark of W** |

All papers should be typed via a word processor and presented both in paper form as well as electronically via Blackboard. **Late papers will be discounted by the hour. They will also go through Turn It In Screening**

**VI. Alternative Short Paper Topics as well as for Term Papers**:

**Alternative Short Paper Topics for Papers 1 and 2:**

1. Slavery in Africa. Explain when and where slavery existed in Africa (or in a part of Africa). Be sure to distinguish it from other similar kinds of institutions. For at least one specific area, why did it appear and subsequently disappear? What were the short-run and long-run effects in the area you focus on? Was it profitable? If so, to whom? Was there anything voluntary about the people brought into slavery? How was the market organized?
2. Explain and provide evidence for that explanation why land sales and/or rental markets are underdeveloped in the rural areas of a particular country or region. (Especially useful: de Janvry et al 2001).
3. Describe briefly, derive policy implications of and critique one empirical attempt to test for a development trap in a developing country. Does it exist? And how do you know? In that context what would you recommend to get out of the trap?
4. Explain changes over time in the PISA scores of males and females in at least two developing countries. See OECD PISA scores and other sources. Provide evidence for your findings

e. Compare a model with one incomplete factor market with one with two incomplete markets as well as with no incomplete markets. What different implications can you derive? (Do not consider the same incomplete market as in Bardhan and Udry). Explain how you might test which model is the most appropriate.

f. Explain with reference to actual experience why crop insurance is totally or partially not available in a developing country of your choice. Cite attempts to develop it and the experience in doing so.

g. Conduct a Comparative Analysis of at least two Different Agricultural Cooperatives, Marketing Boards, or Growers Associations, Examine the extent to which participation is and should be compulsory. Identify the externalities involved. What explains differences in their success in dealing with these externalities?

h. Examine the extent of land registration over time in at least two countries. Explain the patterns and Differences. Look for “Rural Development Studies” of World Bank for Example that of El Salvador 1998. Brian Trackman, William Fisher and Luis Salas 1999 The Reform of Property Registration Systems in Costa Rica: A Status Report” Harvard Institute of International Development

i. Produce comprehensive cross country and over time data on land ownership inequality (Land Ginis) and explain either the determinants thereof or the effects thereof.. This should be your own work not simply reporting on what others have written.

j. Find historical statistics on an emerging stock market (or any stock market in a developing country). Identify relevant rules under which the market has operated over time and possible changes therein. What are the institutional constraints on the development of this market? What policy recommendations would you make to limit these constraints and why? (Useful reference:

Peter Blair Henry Do Stock Market Liberalizations Case Investment Booms? (check his website at Stanford Business School)

k. Using de Soto’s *The Mystery of Capital* and some of the work by Libecap, e.g., Libecap 1978 as background, compare the institutions that have emerged historically in the mining sector of an LDC of your choice with the comparable ones for the U.S.. Give greater priority to a highly valued type of product like diamonds, gold, silver, etc. as opposed to iron ore, bauxite. What explains the differences and what are the effects? What social and economic problems seem to be associated with mining? Do you agree that the fundamental differences are because of the way property rights have evolved?

l. For any kind of risk reduction mechanism, institution or market, compare the way that institution has developed in a developing country with that in a developed country. What lessons from experience in the one context can be drawn for the other?

m. Culture, diet and attitudes may shape expectations, willingness to cooperate, save and invest, and bear risk. Discuss measurement problems. Develop a hypothesis of how such differences across societies may have arisen and how they might explain different historical trajectories in different societies, e.g., countries or groups within countries. Offer at least anecdotal evidence for or against your hypothesis. Write a research proposal about what you might do to accomplish a more adequate test of your hypothesis. Read Bryan Caplan’s “Stigler-Becker vs Myers-Briggs” as well as Chapter 2 in Y&N and some of the references therein and Platteau Ch 5-7.

n. What effects are the bio-tech revolution and patenting of crop varieties having on LDC agriculture? Analyze the benefits and costs of alternative strategies that LDCs may take in dealing with these problems.

o. Trace the history of court system in one or more developing countries. Find indicators of the efficiency of the judicial system over time and evidence of their influence on economic activity. Which sectors and types of agents are most affected?

p. What explains variations across countries and over time in deforestation? E.g.,

Why is Haiti so Deforested Relative to Dominican Republic? (Kenneth Evan Sharpe Peasant Politics: Struggle in a Dominican Village Johns Hopkins Press1977)

q. Are there positive or negative spillovers from Private Foreign Direct Investment? Analyze a case study, critique the methodology and its findings. What biases are possible in the study?

r. Survey the studies on Conditional Cash Transfer programs. Which programs have worked better than others? Why and what is the evidence?

s. What policies can oil exporting countries adopt to mitigate the curse and maximize the blessing possibilities?

t. How, when and why does a developing country introduce the kind of fiscal rules or other mechanisms that can reduce the extreme cyclicality and harmful volatility effects of oil exports

u. Why do some farmers in certain countries or regions not use sufficient fertilizer and what policies may work best to overcome these problems?

v. What can and should be done about the tendency for farmers to extract and use too much underground water? Why does this occur?

w. Compare at least three different labor unions in two or more developing countries and track their rules, membership and their effects over time

**x.** Compare and explain the effectiveness (positive or negative) of policies, institutional and other mechanisms used to reduce conflict and promote peace among countries previously engaged in conflict. In two or more societies. Examples might include the promotion of mutual trade, or production processes, investments and the previously conflicting groups might be ethnicities, racial groups, language groups, political groups or nationalities**.**

**VII. Class Schedule Note: \* indicates required reading,\*\* article for class presentation**

1. The Concept of Development and Its Implications for Well-being, Happiness

\*A.K. Sen "The Concept of Development", *HDE*, Ch1

AK Sen Inequality Reexamined Harvard, Russell Sage 1992 Ch 1-4.

R.A. Easterlin " Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence in Nations and Households" in *Economic Growth: Essays in*

R.A. Easterlin "Why Isn't the Whole World Developed?" Ch. 5, and Does Satisfying Material Needs Increase Human Happiness? Ch 10 in R.E. Easterlin *Growth Triumphant: The Twenty-first Century in Historical Perspective*. U. Michigan Press1996.

R.A. Easterlin 2001 “Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory”, Economic Journal July

R.A. Easterlin 2000.Life Cycle Welfare: Trends and Differences Journal of Happiness Studies 2, 1-12.

*Question to think about: Why might higher income not lead to greater sense of well-being and happiness?*

2. Some Methodological Issues in Development

*a. Equilibrium or Disequilibrium*

Nugent and Yotopoulos "What Has Orthodox Development Economics Learned from Recent Experience?" *WD* 7 1979, 541-554

b.*Operational Problems and Hypothesis Testing*

YN Ch 2,3

3. Some General Theories and Strategies of Development Economics

*The Dual Economy Model and Labor Surplus*

\*A. Lewis Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor" *The Manchester School r*eprinted in AS

<http://www.unc.edu/~wwolford/Geography160/368lewistable.pdf>

\*J.C.H. Fei and G. Ranis "A Theory of Economic Development" *AER* 61 (Sept.1961), 533-564 Comment, Reply Sept 1971

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950368/95p00015/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b4239c&dpi=3&config=jstor>

D. Jorgenson, Testing Alternative Theories of the Development of a Dual Economy" in I. Adelman and E. Thorbecke *The Theory and Design of Economic Development* or similar paper

Eswaran and A. Kotwal "A Theory of Real Wage Growth in LDCs", *JDE* 42 (Dec 1993), 243-270.

Bardhan and Udry Ch 15

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6VBV-458WKNC-3G-1&_cdi=5936&_user=1181656&_orig=browse&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F1993&_sk=999579997&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkWb&md5=f78723f6bb924dd8960b884af843a6fa&ie=/sdarticle.pdf>

*Question to think about: Has China’s surplus labor come to an end? How can you tell?*

Edward Goldberg: “China and the One-Two Punch”

4.Traps:. Theories of Low Level Equilibrium Traps and Strategies to Get Out of Them

Leibenstein, Nurkse, Hirschman, Geshenkron, Boeke and Mydal,

Multiple Equilibria and Game Theory Coordination Problems, Interlocked Technology and Externalities

R. Nurkse 1953. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries

\*Albert Hirschman 1958. *The Strategy of Economic Development*. New Haven: Yale U. Press. ®, Ch. 5,6

Harvey Leibenstein 1957. *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth*. New York: John Wiley.

Harvey Leibenstein 1978. *General X-Efficiency Theory and Economic Development*. New York: Oxford. ®

*Some Relevant Games for Use in Traps and other issues*

\*Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny “Industrialization and the Big Push” JPE 97, 1003-1026. reprinted in MR, Ch 1. For 1/19

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di951058/95p0127w/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b423a2&dpi=3&config=jstor>

\* Collier, Paul 2009 The Bottom Billion

\*Hansen and Libecap 2004. “Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s” JPE, 112 (3), 665-694 in class paper

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/journal/issues/v112n3/112304/112304.html>

\*Azariadis and Drazen, 1990 “Threshold Externalities in Economic Development QJE 105, 501-526.

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di971077/97p0012f/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b423a2&dpi=3&config=jstor>

\*Azariadis and Stachurski 2004, Poverty Traps University of Melbourne

<http://eprints.infodiv.unimelb.edu.au/archive/00002355/01/913.pdf>

\*Baland and Francois 1996 Innovation, Monopolies and the Poverty Trap, JDE 49, 151-178.

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBV-3VW1T1S-M/2/cf779895773a558a759d9809b03e732a>

(click on PDF)

Magruder 2013 Can Minimum Wages Cause a Big Push? Evidence from Indonesia JDE 100 48-61,

Bulman, Eden and Nguyen 2014. Transitioning from Low Income Growth to High Income Growth WB Discussion Paper

J. Felipe 2012.Tracking the Middle Income Trap: What Is it, Who is in it and Why? Asian Development Bank Working Paper no 306.

K. Ohno 2009 Avoiding the Middle Income Trap: Renovating Industrial Policy Formulation in Vietnam: ASEAN Economic Bulletin 26 (1) 25-43.

Agenor, Canuto and Jelenic 2012 Avoiding Middle Income Traps, Economic Prmise World Bank Working Paper 98, Nov 2012

Aiyar, Duval, Puy, Wu and Zhang 2013. Growth Slowdowns and the Middle Income Trap, Asia and Pacific Dep, IMF Working Paper No 71,

Oaus 2009 The Rise of China:Implications for Latin America Development Policy Review 27, 419-456. Argues for R&D subsidies

Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009 Can Malaysia Escape the Middle Income Trap? World Bank DRG Policy Research Working Paper 4971

Eichengreen, Park and Shin 2011 When Fast Growing Economies Slow Down

5. Important Analytics for Household and Factor Demand Analysis

\*Bardhan and Udry, Ch. 1-3

J. Strauss and D. Thomas “Human Resources: Empirical Modelling of Household and Family Decisions, *HDE* v. 3A p 1883-2023 ®

D. Benjamin 1992. Household Composition, Labor Markets and Labor Demand: Testing for Separation in Agricultural Household Models" *Econometrica* 60 (March), 287-322.

*Question to think about: What is separability and why do we care about it?*

6. Agriculture, Land and Institutional issues

**a. Contractual Choice and the Paradox of Sharecropping**

Higgs Metayage in Western France Economic Journal v 4 No 13 March 1894!!!!

\* Alston, Datta and Nugent "Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transaction Costs" *JPE* 92 (1984) 1121-1133.

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di951028/95p0091o/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b423a2&dpi=3&config=jstor>

S. Cheung 1969 Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, JLE 12 (1), 23-42.

Eswaran and Kotwal "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture" *AER* 75 (March 1985) 352-368.

J-P Platteau and J.B. Nugent "Contractual Relationships and their Rationale in Marine Fishing" *JDS*

\*Radwan Shaban 1987 Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping JPE and reprinted Ch 4 in BUR thursday

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di951046/95p0028a/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b423a2&dpi=3&config=jstor>

J. Stiglitz "Economic Organization, Information and Development" *HDE*, Ch. 5

Karla Hoff, "Land Taxes, Output Taxes and Sharecropping: Was Henry George Right?" and Jonathan Skinner," If Agricultural Land Taxation is so Efficient, Why Is It So Rarely Used?" in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz,

Datta and Nugent 1989, ch2 in Nabli and Nugent, eds.

S. Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine 1995 “Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts” *RAND Journal* 26, (Winter) 761-781.

\*C. Hsiao, J. Nugent, Perrigne and Qiu, 1997. "Shares vs. Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs" *JCE*

Sadoulet, Fukui and de Janvry 1994. Efficient Share Tenancy Contracts under Risk: The Case of Two Rice-Growing Villages in Thailand JDE

Tyagi, A. and Himanshu 2011 “Tenancy in Palanpur”, Working Paper, Asia Research Centre.

**b***.* **Water and Sustainability Issues**

**Collectives and Collective action**

Datta and Nugent Review of Mancur Olson and others

Group Characteristics

Applications to Agricultural cooperatives etc.

Llamas and Santos 2005 Intensive Groundwater Use: Silent Revolution and Potential Source of Social Conflict” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 337-341.

Madani and Dinar 2012 Non-Cooperative Institutions for Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management: Applications to Groundwater, Ecological Economics,

Maria-Saleth and Dinar 2004. The Institutional Economics of Water: A Cross-Country Analysis of Institutions and Performance E. Elgar

Maria-Saleth and Dinar 2008. Linkages within Institutional Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Water Institutions”, Journal of Institutional Economics 4(3) 375—401.

Moench Water and the Potential for Social Instability: Livelihoods, Migration and the Building Society, Natural Resources Forum 26, 195-204.

**c. Transaction Costs, Property Rights in Land, the Land Market, Land Inequality**

Grossman and Hart 1986 “Ownership” JPE.

Kenneth Binmore Game Theory and the Social Contract 1994

Robert Sugden The Economics of Rights Cooperation and Welfare 1986, 2004.

\*\*Hernando de Soto The Mystery of Capital 2000 Ch 5, 6

\*E. Field 2007. “Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru” QJE 122 1561-1602. tuesday

\*\*Aryeetey and Udry 2010. Creating Property Rights: Land Banks in Ghana” AER PP, Paige, Jeffery M. 1997. Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America. Harvard University Press

\*Antonio Bento et al. “Does Titling Matter? Evidence from Housing Markets in India”

Browning, David 1971. El Salvador: Landscape and Society. Oxford

Nugent and Robinson “Are Endowments Fate?”

Nugent and Saddi When and How Do Land Rights Become Effective? Historical Evidence from Brazil

Gary Libecap 1978. Economic Variables and the Development of the Law; The Case of Western Mineral Rights JEH, 38, 2, reprinted in Alston, Eggertsson and North, eds. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change,

Gary Libecap 1978. The Evolution of Private Mineral Rights: Nevada’s Comstock Lode. New York: Arno Press.

Gary Libecap 1989. Contracting for Property Rights Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

John McIntire "Markets and Contracts in Agricultural Pastoralism" in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz

Shem Migot-Adholla, Peter B. Hazell, Benoit Blarel and Frank Place Indigenous Land Rights Systems in SubSahara Africa: A Constraint on Productivity? Ch 14 in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz

Hoff "Designing Land Policies: An Overview" Ch 11 in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz

Basu Ch 11,12

Sserunkuuma and Olson 2001. Private Property Rights and Overgrazing: An Empirical Assessment of Pastoralists in Nyabushozi County, Western Uganda EDCC 49 (4)

O. Williamson 1985. *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*. Free Press ®

H.P. Binswanger , Klaus Deininger and Gershon Feder Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations, *HDE* v 3B ch 42, 2659-2772

Nugent and Sanchez, "The Efficiency of the Mesta Reconsidered: A Parable*" Explorations in Economic History* 26 (1989),261-184.

\*\*Nugent and Sanchez, "Tribes, Chiefs and Transhumance" *EDCC.*

[*http://www.jstor.org/view/00130079/ap040182/04a00040/0*](http://www.jstor.org/view/00130079/ap040182/04a00040/0)

\*T. Besley 1995 Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana JPE 103, 903-937. Reprinted in BUR Ch 12.

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di980616/98p0254z/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99331200501b4ed42&dpi=3&config=jstor>

H. Grossman 2001 The Creation of Effective Property Rights AER May 347-352.

R. Barrows, Michael Carter, Don Kanel and Michael Roth “Land Ownership Security and Farm Investment: Comment” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71, 75-100.

Onoma 2010 The Politics of Property Rights Institutions in Africa Cambridge Unversity Press.

7. Labor, Property rights, Labor Markets

.**a . Property Rights in Man: Slavery and Encomiendas and the Consequences**

\*\* E.D. Domar “The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis*” Journal of Economic History* v. 30, no. 1, 1970, 18-32

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00220507/di975610/97p0005w/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b423a2&dpi=3&config=jstor>

C. Meillasoux 1991. *The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ®

J. Blum 1977 *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*. Princeton. Princeton University Press.

James Searing 1993. West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce, the Senegal River Valley, 1700-1860. ®

S. Engerman 1973 Some Considerations Relating to Property Rights in Man”, JEH 33 (March) 43-65.

Fogel and Engerman 1974. Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery. Boston: Little, Brown

Michael Bush 1996. Serfdom and Slavery : Studies in Human Bondage London: Longman

Conrad and Meyer: The Economics of Slavery and Other Studies in Economic History Aldine: Chicago 1964

E. Domar and M. Machina 1984 On the Profitability of Russian Serfdom JEH 44 (4) 919-955.

Peter Kolchin 1987 Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom. Cambridge: Harvard U Press.

Maurice Bloch 1980. Modes of Production and Slavery in Madagascar: Two Case Studies” Asian and African Systems of Slavery. Berkeley: U of California Press.

Peter Hogg 1973 The African Slave Trade and its Suppression London: Frank Cass

P. Manning 1990. Slavery and African Life Cambridge U. Press.

Rachel Heath 2014 Why Do Firms Hire Using Referrals: Evidence from Bangladesh Garment Factories

Robert Thomas and Richard Bean 1974. The Fishers of Men: The Profits of the Slave Trade”, Journal of Economic History 34 (December)

Robin Law 1991 The Slave Coast of West Africa: 1550-1750. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Joseph Inikori 1981. Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century, Journal of Economic History 41 (December)

Tom Brass *Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labor*

Joseph Inikori 1982 Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies. NY: Africana Pub. Co.

Joseph Inikori 1992 Slavery and Atlantic Commerce 1650-1800 AER 82 (May)

Philip Curtin Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade Madison: U of Wisconsin Press.

Philip Curtin 1998 The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex Cambridge University Press.

Gemery and Hogendorn 1979 The Uncommon Market: Essays in Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade Academic Press

Rondo Cameron 1997 A Concise Economic History of the World from Paleolithic Times to the Present Oxford U Press 3rd Edition.

\*Nathan Nunn 2005) “Slavery, Institutional Development and Long-Run Growth in Africa:1400-2000” Thursday

<http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/nunn.pdf>

Nathan Nunn 2005”Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to its Current Underdevelopment”

Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman 1974. Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery. Boston, Little Brown

Fogel and Engerman 1989 Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery. Norton.

*Question to think about: Under what conditions are we likely to see evidence of slavery?*

**b. Female and Child Labor Force Participation and Fertility, Security and Remittances**

C. Goldin 1995 “The U-shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Development and Economic History” in T.Paul Schultz, ed., *Investment in Women’s Human Capital*, Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 61-90.

J-M Baland, Jean Dreze and Luc Leruth Daily Wages and Piece Rates in Agrarian Economies, JDE 59 (2) 1999 445-461.

Cheung, Steven “The Enforcement of Property Rights in Children and the Marriage Contract” Economic Journal 82 (June 1972), 641-657.

J.B. Nugent, "The Old Age Security Motive for Fertility", *PDR* 11 (March 1985

Dimova and Wolff 2011. Do Downward Private Transfers Enhance Maternal Labor Supply? Evidence from around Europe Journal of Population Ecoomics 24 (3), 911-933.

R.E.B. Lucas and O. Stark, "Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana", *JPE* 1985

Butler and Horowitz Labor Supply and Wages among Nuclear and Extended Households: The Suranamese Experiment

\*Kaushik Basu and P.H. Van 1998 The Economics of Child Labor, American Economic Review 88 Tuesday

<http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/ap000003/00a00070/0?frame=noframe&userID=807d34b7@usc.edu/01cc99332100501b423a2&dpi=3&config=jstor>

\*\* K.A. Swinnerton and C.A. Rogers 1999 “The economics of Child Labor: Comment” AER 89 (5), 1382-85. Shows that distribution of non-labor income also matters for whether there is child labor or not.

\*\*Edmonds Child Labor HDE4, Ch 57

P Bharadwaj, Lea Lakdawala and N Li Perverse Consequences of Well-Intentioned Regulation: Evidence from India’s Child Labor Ban

Cigno and F.C. Rosati 2005. The Economics of Child Labor. NY. Oxford

Gee, Kevin 2010. Reducing Child Labor through CCTs: Evidence from Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social “, Development Policy Review 28 \*6)

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**VIII. Textbooks and Journals**

1. ***Textbooks and Key Reference Books*** (on reserve in Leavey Library)

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Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry 1995*. Quantitative Development Policy Analysis.*Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

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***B. Journals***

AER American Economic Review

AEJ American Economic Journal

AJAE American Journal of Agricultural Economics

CMJE Cambridge Journal of Economics

EDCC Economic Development and Cultural Change

EJ Economic Journal

EPW Economic and Political Weekly

JDA Journal of Developing Areas

JDE Journal of Development Economics

JDS Journal of Development Studies

JEL Journal of Economic Literature

JME Journal of Monetary Economics

JLE Journal of Law and Economics

JPE Journal of Political Economy

MS Manchester School

OEP Oxford Economic Papers

PDR Population and Development Review

QJE Quarterly Journal of Economics

REST Review of Economics and Statistics

WBER World Bank Economic Review

WD World Development

JEP Journal of Economic Perspectives

MEDJ Middle East Development Journal

***C. Useful Websites and Data Sources:***

***Especially useful Microdata sets for term papers in this Class:***

**Enterprise Surveys,** World Bank. These can be downloaded for a large number of countries **Global Entrepreneurship Monitor**

**See also the Growing list of Microdataa sets on the World Bank’s web page**

Resources for economists on the internet at: <http://econwpa.wust1.edu/EconFAQ/EconFAQ.htm1>

**Penn World Tables** version 5.6 for 152 countries on 29 variables 1960-1992 NBER available

through the University of Toronto as http://datacentre.epas.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/pwt.htm1

The Interamerican Bank and The Asian Development Bank also have nice Web sites: http://www.iadb.org and http://www.asiandevbank.org

UNDP web site http://www.undp.org

OECD:

http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/htm/list.htm

http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/pdf/METHOD.PDF

has all the info or the source for each indicator

http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/index.htm

Hardcopy yearbooks available in VKC Library:

International Monetary Fund: Yearbook of Government Finance Statistics, Yearbook of International Financial Statistics, International Financial Statistics (monthly), Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,

United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics

United Nations, Handbook of World Development Statistics (natl. accounts), United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report

UNIDO, UNCTAD, ILO, FAO and the regional commissions of the United Nations also put out yearbooks and data series of different types

World Bank: World Development Reports of various years. World Tables various years and on diskette; Social Development indicators. Available on-line via wwweb Economic Growth project via <http://www.worldbank.org/htm1/prdmg/grthweb/growth_t.htm>, World Bank (devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline), World Development Indicators

Poverty Data from Xavier Sala-I-Martin The World Distribution of Income NBER 8933

The Interamerican Bank and The Asian Development Bank also have nice Web sites: http://www.iadb.org and http://www.asiandevbank.org

UNDP web site http://www.undp.org

International Monetary Fund: Yearbook of Government Finance Statistics, Yearbook of International Financial Statistics, International Financial Statistics (monthly), Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,

United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics

United Nations, Handbook of World Development Statistics (natl. accounts), United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report

UNIDO, UNCTAD, ILO, FAO and the regional commissions of the United Nations also put out yearbooks and data series of different types